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Executive Summary  
 
Spain is often characterised as one of Europe’s countries of new immigration and one of the countries 
representing the so-called Mediterranean model. Although there is no consensus on the exact meaning 
of this label, Spain shares a number of trends with other Southern European countries such as Italy, 
Greece and Portugal. First, all these countries have changed from being regions of emigration to 
receiving significant migration flows and having a percentage of immigrants in relation to their total 
population comparable to those of Northern European countries. Second, in most Southern European 
countries huge foreign labour demands in the last twenty years have been combined with rather 
restrictive or non-working admission policies, which led to a model of irregular migration with 
frequent regularisation programmes. 
Despite all these similarities, there are also significant differences. The first relevant difference 
is in terms of national identity. As we will see, the multi-national character of the Spanish state 
influences how national identity is conceptualised and how immigration is perceived and 
accommodated. Another relevant difference concerns the discourses on immigration. In general terms, 
public perceptions of immigration are much more positive in Spain than in Italy or Greece. This has 
been accompanied by a policy discourse that enhances cultural difference and presents integration as a 
bi-directional process rather than as a unidirectional path towards assimilation into the dominant 
culture. 
 This report focuses on three main issues. First, we examine the main factors that have 
determined the development of the predominant conception of Spanish identity and its impact on the 
accommodation of diversity. Second, we outline the main immigrant minority groups and briefly 
identify the main diversity challenges. Finally, we consider how tolerance has been thematised in the 
Spanish case. We aim to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been understood in terms of 
‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or accommodation.  
 
 
National identity and state formation 
 
Language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism) have often been presented as the main pillars of 
Spanish identity or Spanishness. This discourse of identity has created a strong narrative of similarity 
and difference: similarity in terms of those who speak Spanish and profess Catholicism, originally 
meaning Castilians and subsequently Latin Americans and Spaniards in general; and difference 
regarding those who either do not speak Spanish or profess other religions.  
Despite this discourse on Spanish identity or Spanishness, Spain has to a great extent remained a 
multinational country composed of at least three major historical minority nations with their own 
languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. It is in this context that immigration has often been 
perceived as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity. 
 The conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to minority nations started at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, when regions such as Catalonia or the Basque Country witnessed important 
flows of immigration from elsewhere in Spain. Though Spaniards, these migrants were perceived as 
foreigners in linguistic and cultural terms. As a consequence, their arrival generated a major social, 
political and ideological debate on its impact on national identity and the difficulties arising from their 
integration. Indeed, a similar debate emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, when on this occasion, the 
arrival of international migrants was seen as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity. 
These debates on immigration have also acted as a battlefield for the continuous redefinition of the 
contours of national identities. As analysed by Gil Araújo (2009: 234-240), the immigration of the 
1950s and 1960s led to a redefinition of the meaning of ‘being Catalan’ as ‘living and working in 
Catalonia’ or ‘wanting to be Catalan’. With the end of the Franco dictatorship and the democratisation 
process, language became the main marker of Catalan identity. This is clearly illustrated by the 
Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) and the National Pact on Immigration (2009): 
  
while citizenship rights are linked to local residence (registration on the municipal census or el 




There were 4,744,169 foreign residents in Spain in June 2010, accounting for more than 10 per cent of 
the Spanish population. Most foreign residents come from other EU countries (39 per cent), 
Iberoamerica (29.9 per cent), Africa (20 per cent), Asia (6 per cent), non-EU European countries (3 
per cent) and North America (0.4 per cent). The largest national immigrant groups are Romanians, 
Moroccans, Ecuadorians, Colombians, British, Italians, Bulgarians, Chinese, Peruvians and 
Portuguese (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010). 
 Particular conflicts have arisen around particular groups. For instance, in February 2000, there 
was a three-day campaign of violence against Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido (a market-gardening 
town in south-eastern Spain); in September 2004, around 500 people demonstrated in Elche (a town 
near Valencia) to protest against the presence of Chinese businessmen in the area; or in April 2010 the 
right-wing party Partido Popular (PP) in Badalona (a town near Barcelona) published a pamphlet 
against Rumanians and referred to Rumanian Gypsies as a ‘plague’, associating them with 
‘insecurity’, ‘dirt’ and ‘criminality’. These conflicts, however, should be understood in socio-
economic terms rather than as culturally driven. If we focus exclusively on diversity challenges, then 
the focus should be on categories (religion and language) rather than on groups. 
 With regard to religion, we identify three types of challenges. First, we should refer to 
conflicts around mosques, oratories and cemeteries. These include the opposition against the building 
of mosques and/or opening of religious centres or oratories by both citizens and government; the 
discussion on the access of women to mosques and oratories or on the foreign funding of mosques; 
and the criticism of radical imams leading mosques. Second, there have also been conflicts around 
religious education, for instance on the predominance of Catholic education in schools, the right of 
religious education in both public and private schools or the recently introduced course on ‘Education 
for Citizenship and Human Rights’. Third, conflicts have also arisen around the dress code and in 
particular regarding the use of headscarves in schools and burqas and niqabs in public spaces. 
 With regard to language, conflicts have mostly taken place in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, where the presence of Latin American immigrants reinforces the weight of Castilian Spanish 
and is therefore often perceived as a threat to the situation of minority languages. In this context, 
debates have arisen around two main questions: which language should have preference in schools and 
which one should be the basic public language in administration, media and for the reception of 
immigrants. 
 
Definitions of tolerance 
 
After having described the key features of Spanish national identity and having mapped the main 
conflicts based around diversity in Spain, it remains to be seen under what terms these tensions have 
been perceived. This will allow us to understand which diversity-related conflicts have been 
understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, recognition or 
accommodation.  
A review of parliamentary discussions and electoral programmes from the main political 
parties (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and the Partido Popular) since the 1980s shows that the 
term tolerance is seldom used by Spanish politicians and, when referred to, it is exclusively in terms of 
value, habit/attitude/disposition or virtue. A look at integration plans at both national and regional 
level leads to the same conclusion: the term tolerance is only used as a synonym of respect for 
difference. We can therefore conclude that the term tolerance is rarely used and when it is, it refers to 
liberal respect, meaning the need for democratic citizens to respect each other as legal and political 
equals, according to a logic of emancipation rather than toleration. 
Despite this reluctance to use the word tolerance in other senses than that of respect and 
recognition, there seems to be a general consensus that basic values such as human dignity and human 
  
rights, freedom, democracy and equality should be respected. In practice, even when not formulated in 
this way, these values define the limits of what can and cannot be tolerated. In this respect, it can be 
said that the notion of ‘tolerance’ does exist but that the concept does not. In other words, while the 
meanings and practices of tolerance are known and used, there is no term to cover them. In the 
following paragraphs, we will discuss in which context, regarding what and by whom the limits of 
what is tolerable and what is not have been imposed. 
Regarding the context, it is possible to say that the ‘tolerance’ boundary is commonly referred 
to when cultural diversity is perceived as being contradictory to human rights, freedom and individual 
autonomy/dignity. Regarding the what, we can conclude that the ‘tolerance’ boundary has mainly been 
drawn with regard to Islam. Once again on the basis of the articles published in El País, most debates 
on the opposition between cultural diversity on the one hand, and human rights and freedom on the 
other have been based around issues such as headscarves in schools, burqas in public spaces and, more 
generally, male/female relations. In these debates, there is a tendency to indule in generalisations, i.e. 
discussions do not only focus on particular practices by particular people but tend to attribute 
particular practices to the whole group (Muslims) and religion (Islam). This leads us to conclude that 
when looking at media debates, there is a common (and dangerous) shift from targeting particular 
practices to targeting groups and ‘cultures’ as a whole. 
Finally, regarding the who, i.e. who has the power to tolerate or otherwise, most cases involve 
either local administrations or practitioners, including social workers and educators. This leads us to 
two main conclusions. First, local authorities and practitioners (within the state apparatus or 
otherwise) seem to be the main actors playing the role of ‘tolerators’. In this regard, although further 
research is needed, our hypothesis is that toleration is particularly exercised among the actors most 
deeply involved in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. Second, we can also 
conclude that, when looking at conflicts based around diversity and analysing the limits of what is 
considered as tolerable or not, we should take into account not only the central government but also a 
wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such as regional and local governments; 
other institutions, agencies and practitioners within the state apparatus; and other relevant actors, such 
as politicians, NGOs and private institutions.  
Keywords 
 
Tolerance, diversity, immigration, Spain, multi-nationality, religion, language
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Spain is often characterised as one of Europe’s countries of new immigration and one of the 
countries representing the so-called Mediterranean model. Although there is no consensus on 
the exact meaning of this label, Spain shares a number of trends with other Southern 
European countries such as Italy, Greece and Portugal. First, all these countries have changed 
from being regions of emigration to receiving significant migration flows and having a 
percentage of immigrants in relation to their total population comparable to those of Northern 
European countries. In Spain, the number of foreign residents increased from 250,000 (0.75 
per cent of the total population) in 1985 to 900,000 (2.18 per cent) in 2000, 1.3 million (3.10 
per cent) in 2002, 3 million (6.7 per cent) in 2006 and 4.8 million (more than 10 per cent) in 
2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010). 
 Second, in most Southern European countries huge foreign labour demands in the last 
twenty years have been combined with rather restrictive or non-working admission policies, 
which led to a model of irregular migration with frequent regularisation programmes. 
Although keeping count of the number of irregular immigrants is always an impossible task, it 
can be said that most foreign residents in Spain have been irregular at least once. For 
example, at the end of 2000, regularisation papers accounted for two out of three residence 
permits then in force (Izquierdo, 2006: 74). In absolute terms, the periodical regularisation 
initiatives (1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005) have given some idea of the growing 
numbers of irregular immigrants. 
 Despite all these similarities, there are also significant differences. The first relevant 
difference is in terms of national identity. As we will see, the multi-national character of the 
Spanish state influences how national identity is conceptualised and how immigration is 
perceived and accommodated. Another relevant difference concerns the discourses on 
immigration. In general terms, public perceptions of immigration are much more positive in 
Spain than in Italy or Greece. This has been accompanied by a policy discourse that enhances 
cultural difference and presents integration as a bi-directional process rather than as a 
unidirectional path towards assimilation into the dominant culture. 
 This report focuses on three main issues. First, we examine the main factors that have 
determined the development of the predominant conception of Spanish identity and its impact 
on the accommodation of diversity. Second, we outline the main immigrant minority groups 
and briefly identify the main diversity challenges. Diversity challenges are analysed in terms 
of categories rather than groups as this allows us to: a) establish a clear link between national 
identity and diversity challenges; b) focus on the conflict itself and particularly on those 
issues/practices under discussion; and c) look at diversity in a broader sense, including 
debates on national cultural and linguistic diversity. Third, we consider how tolerance has 
been thematised in the Spanish case. We aim to understand which diversity-related conflicts 
have been understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, 
recognition or accommodation. Finally, we highlight the main distinctive features of the 
Spanish case from a comparative European perspective in the conclusions. 
  
 
2. National identity and state formation 
 
In this chapter, we identify the two main markers of Spanish identity from a historical 
perspective: language and religion. We then consider how immigration has been perceived as 
a challenge to linguistic and cultural (national) diversity. In the following section, the focus 
shifts to the role played by Europe in understanding immigration and the formulation of 
Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Spain 
3 
immigration policies in Spain. Finally, we briefly examine the definition of integration and 




Language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism) have often been presented as the main pillars 
of Spanish identity or Spanishness. This discourse of identity has created a strong narrative of 
similarity and difference: similarity in terms of those who speak Spanish and profess 
Catholicism, originally meaning Castilians and subsequently Latin Americans and Spaniards 
in general; and difference regarding those who either do not speak Spanish or profess other 
religions.  
 Spanish identity was initially codified in the late fifteen century, and above all in the 
symbolic year of 1492, when the Sephardic Jews, Muslims and Gypsies were expelled and 
Castile officially began the conquest of America and what could be called the global 
expansion of Spanish Catholicism and Messianism. The politics of the so-called Catholic 
Monarchs has many elements of what we would today refer to as ethnic cleansing (Zapata-
Barrero, 2006: 146). Islam has historically been excluded from the formation of the Spanish 
identity in which a Christian ‘us’ has been juxtaposed to an Islamic ‘other’ (Martín-Muñoz, 
1996: 14). 
 The term Hispanidad was coined in the early twentieth century to counterbalance the 
loss of Spain’s last colonies (Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) by emphasising the 
cultural proximity and historical ties between the newly independent Latin American 
countries and Spain. In the mid-twentieth century, it was taken up again by Franco’s 
dictatorship 'precisely to comprise the whole Spanish area of influence, designating a 
linguistic (Spanish) and religious (Catholic) community and creating a sense of belonging, 
excluding non-Spanish speakers, atheists and Muslims' (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 148). The 
political Francoist argument 'habla cristiano' (speak Christian) is a clear example of how the 
regime fostered an ambiguity between Spanish (the language) and Christianity (the religion) 
in order to build a culturally homogeneous society and exclude any sort of diversity. 
 The Spanish Constitution (1978), which emerged from the Transition period (1975-78) 
after almost forty years of Franco’s dictatorship, left aspects linked to religion and linguistic 
and national pluralism unresolved. For instance, the Catholic Church still has some degree of 
control over cultural hegemony in the educational system, and is actively opposing 
government decisions related to 'education for citizenship', which recognise homosexual 
marriages, amongst other disputed topics. The difficulty of multinational recognition in the 
social and political debate is another example of an unresolved issue concerning national 
pluralism in Spain. 
 
 
2.2. Minority nations 
Despite the construction of a Spanish identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spain 
has to a great extent remained a multinational country (see Gagnon and Tully 2001, Máiz and 
Requejo 2005, Requejo 2005) composed of at least three major historical minority nations 
with their own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. While these languages were 
forbidden or reduced to folklore status during the Franco dictatorship (1939-1975), they were 
finally recognised by the Spanish Constitution in 1978. Moreover, the Spanish 
democratisation and constitutional process led to a gradual decentralisation with a differential 
Ricard Zapata-Barrero & Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas 
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treatment for minority nations and the recognition of specific rights for historic ‘nationalities’ 
(Nagel, 2006). 
 In this context, immigration has often been perceived as a challenge to linguistic and 
cultural diversity. The conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to minority nations started 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, when regions such as Catalonia or the Basque 
Country witnessed important flows of immigration from elsewhere in Spain. Though 
Spaniards, these migrants were perceived as foreigners in linguistic and cultural terms. As a 
consequence, their arrival generated a major social, political and ideological debate on its 
impact on national identity and the difficulties arising from their integration (Calvo and Vega, 
1978). Indeed, a similar debate emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, when on this occasion, the 
arrival of international migrants was seen as a challenge to linguistic and cultural diversity. 
 These debates on immigration have also acted as a battlefield for the continuous 
redefinition of the contours of national identities. As analysed by Gil Araújo (2009: 234-240), 
the immigration of the 1950s and 1960s led to a redefinition of the meaning of ‘being 
Catalan’ as ‘living and working in Catalonia’ or ‘wanting to be Catalan’. With the end of the 
Franco dictatorship and the democratisation process, language became the main marker of 
Catalan identity. This is clearly illustrated by the Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan 
(2005-2008) and the National Pact on Immigration (2009): while citizenship rights are linked 
to local residence (registration on the municipal census or el padrón), integration is now more 
than ever associated with speaking Catalan. 
 
 
2.3. The role of Europe 
It was not until Spain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1985 that the need 
to unify and give legal status of law to the various regulations, decrees and bilateral 
agreements on immigration arose. This need was resolved a few months later with the urgent 
enactment of the Ley Orgánica de Extranjería (LOE – Organic Law on Foreigners), which 
made the entry of foreigners and their residence and access to the labour market subject to 
regulation. This change was particularly important for immigrants from Latin America, the 
Philippines and Equatorial Guinea, who had not needed a work permit to work in Spain until 
the enactment of the new law (Izquierdo, 1989: 47).  
This thickening of borders for those ‘privileged foreigners’ coming from the former 
Spanish colonies continued more than a decade later with the extension of visa requirements 
for most Latin American citizens. While politicians and intellectuals from these countries 
protested by pleading historic ties of solidarity with Spain, the imposition of the visa was 
ushered in under the pretext of the need for a common European policy. In this regard, Europe 
was crucial not only as a factor pushing towards more restrictive immigration policies but also 
‘as a way of diluting blame by attributing responsibility to Brussels for a measure that was 
strongly criticised both in Spain and in the Americas’ (Moreno Fuentes, 2005: 116). 
Simultaneously, the regulations that followed the LOE in the EU context introduced 
preferential treatment for EU citizens and their families who unlike non-EU citizens, enjoyed 
freedom of circulation and the right to engage in economic activity regardless of their national 
employment situation. The result was the emergence of a new category of privileged 
foreigners (EU citizens) as opposed to the newly defined ‘rest’ (non-EU citizens). 
Interestingly, as the frontier of the European Union extended eastwards to include most of the 
Eastern European countries, this category of ‘privileged foreigners’ also expanded. For 
instance, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in January 2007, the legal situation of 
Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Spain 
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2.4. 'Accommodation' of diversity 
Although Spain is a laboratory of diversities, there is very little policy discourse on 
immigration and identity (Zapata-Barrero 2009: 119). Indeed, analysis of the parliamentary 
debates and the political parties’ declarations suggests a shared tacit fear of talking about 
immigration in identity terms. This may be explained by the fact that identity is an unsolved 
and incomplete question in Spain (Zapata-Barrero, 2010: 413). To talk about multiculturality 
would necessarily mean talking about multinationality. In other words, talking about 'who is 
Spanish' and who is not would mean beginning an unclear and politically undesirable debate 
about 'what it means to be Spanish'.  
 The avoidance of debates around immigration and identity at Spanish national level to 
date has had two main implications. First, this kind of debate has only taken place at the level 
of the historic autonomous communities (particularly in Catalonia). As seen in the previous 
section, this is where immigration is discussed as a political identity problem. Second, 
diversity is managed not on the basis of established and preconceived ideas – such as French 
republicanism or British multiculturalism – but rather by induction, taking into account 
questions and answers generated by the practice of governance of diversity linked to 
immigration. This pragmatism or ‘practical philosophy’, as defined by Zapata-Barrero (2010: 
412), leads to a problem-driven policy (2010: 426). 
 While there is hardly any debate around immigration and identity at the national level, 
integration is often defined in policy documents and by administrations at various levels, 
politicians and stakeholders as a bi-directional process based on the concept of convivencia 
intercultural. As a key concept in the Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration (2007-
2010), convivencia is used as synonym for integration, and literally means ‘living together,’ 
and interculturalidad is defined as a mechanism for interaction between persons from 
different origins and cultures that leads to the positive valuation and respect of cultural 
diversity. Convivencia intercultural therefore means living together under conditions of 




3. Diversity challenges 
 
In this chapter, we first outline the major immigrant minority groups in Spain, by highlighting 
their main features and identifying the main key challenging events regarding their presence 
in Spain. Second, we examine the main debates on diversity. Since Spanish identity has been 
constructed on the basis of language and religion, it is no surprise that the main debates 
emerged around these two categories. Note that while conflicts around religion could be 
characterised as social conflicts, those around language are of an eminently political nature. 
 
3.1. Immigrant minorities 
There were 4,744,169 foreign residents in Spain in June 2010, accounting for more than 10 
per cent of the Spanish population. Most foreign residents come from other EU countries (39 
per cent), Iberoamerica (29.9 per cent), Africa (20 per cent), Asia (6 per cent), non-EU 
European countries (3 per cent) and North America (0.4 per cent). The largest national 
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immigrant groups are Romanians, Moroccans, Ecuadorians, Colombians, British, Italians, 
Bulgarians, Chinese, Peruvians and Portuguese (see Table 1) (Spanish Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration, 2010). 
 
Table 1: Largest national immigrant groups (absolute numbers and percentages) (6/2010) 
 
Country of origin Absolute numbers Percentage  
Romania 793,205 16.72 
Morocco 758,900 16 
Ecuador 382,129 8.06 
Colombia 264,075 5.57 
United Kingdom 225,391 4.75 
Italy 163,763 3.45 
Bulgaria 154,353 3.25 
China 152,853 3.22 
Peru 138,478 3.12 
Portugal 129,756 2.92 
Bolivia 116,178 2.45 
Germany 113,570 2.39 
France 89,410 1.89 
Argentina 89,201 1.88 
Dominican Republic 85,831 1.81 
Other countries 1,086,050 22.90 
Source: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2/2010 
 
Romanians: there were 793,205 Romanian citizens in Spain in 2010. Most of them arrived in 
Spain after 2000. While in 2006 there were 211,325 Romanians living regularly in Spain, in 
2007 this amount increased to 603,889 (Ministry of the Interior 2006: 154; 2007: 189). This 
growth cannot be explained by an increase in the migratory flows but rather by the fact that 
when Romania joined the EU in 2007, those living and working irregularly in Spain became 
EU citizens and were therefore automatically ‘regularised’.  
In April 2010 the right-wing party Partido Popular (PP) in Badalona – a town near 
Barcelona – published a pamphlet stating ‘We don’t want Romanians’. Its leader Xavier 
García Albiol subsequently clarified that they were referring to Romanian Gypsies and added 
that they were a ‘plague’ and that ‘they came exclusively to relinquish’, associating them with 
‘insecurity’, ‘dirt’ and ‘criminality’. These statements were criticised by all political parties, 
including the representatives of the Partido Popular at regional level, the Romanian embassy 
and Gypsy associations. Interestingly, the (indigenous) Gypsy association in Badalona 
supported the pamphlet. Some months later, during the expulsions of Romanian gypsies in 
France, García Albiol organised a visit in Badalona with Marie-Thérèse Sanchez-Schmid – a 
EP deputy for Sarkozy’s UPM party – arguing that the situation in Badalona was much worse 
than that in France. 
 
Moroccans: Moroccan citizens in Spain are almost as numerous as Romanians (see Table 1). 
Their number has doubled several times in recent years, and was around 200,000 in 2000, 
400,000 in 2004, 650,000 in 2007 and 760,000 in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration, 2010). Despite their proximity in both geographic and cultural terms, 
Moroccans have often been seen as the ‘problematic’ migrants. Zapata-Barrero (2006: 145) 
argues that this is not exactly Islamophobia or religious/cultural racism but Maurophobia 
(phobia of Moors). The historical iconography of the Moors, and the opposition between 
Moors and Christians, started with the Reconquista and intensified from the sixteenth century 
onwards, becoming particularly acute in the nineteenth century with the African War of 1860. 
Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Spain 
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Finally, the outbreak of the Civil War led to the bipolarisation of the image of Moroccans. 
While republicans, socialists, communists and anarchists and peripheral nationalists depicted 
the Moroccans enlisted in Franco’s armies as ‘cruel’ and ‘mercenary’, Francoists gave the 
respectful and paternalistic image of the Moroccan official status (Zapata-Barrero, 2006: 146). 
The three-day campaign of violence against Moroccan immigrants in El Ejido – a 
market-gardening town in south-eastern Spain – in February 2000 shows how this historical 
racism has sometimes led to obvious conflict. In this case, the murder of a young Spanish 
woman by a mentally disturbed Moroccan (who had been refused admittance to a health 
centre shortly before) led to the persecution of Moroccans, who demonstrated and went on 
strike for several days immediately afterwards. This process concluded with the ‘El Ejido 
Agreement’, according to which the various government bodies undertook to ensure better 
living conditions for immigrant workers in the area. Despite this agreement, in subsequent 
seasons the Moroccan workers found that they were being replaced by female workers from 
Eastern Europe. When NGOs, immigrant organisations, unions and some opposition parties 
condemned this situation, the government argued that employers were free to employ 
whoever they wished (El País, 12 June 2002). 
 When explaining the attacks in El Ejido, Martínez Veiga (2002: 133) concludes that 
these were perpetuated as a way to ‘impose discipline, exclusion and, in some ways, let them 
know where they stand: outside. (…) They are expected to work and then to disappear. They 
are made into an instrument of production without bearing in mind the costs of reproduction’. 
The two main factors that according to the author account for the racist campaign against 
Moroccans were labour exploitation and spatial segregation between migrant workers and the 
native population. 
 
Latin Americans: The largest Latin American national groups are from Ecuador (382,129), 
Colombia (264,075), Peru (138,478), Bolivia (116,178), Argentina (89,201) and the 
Dominican Republic (85,831). In contrast to Moroccans, Latin Americans have been for long 
the ‘privileged’ and ‘desired’ immigrants in Spain. This preference has also been enshrined in 
law.  
As an example, the visa requirements for most Latin American citizens did not come 
into force until long after those for other non-EU citizens, and particularly those from North-
African countries. The Citizenship Law is also a good example of this kind of distinction. 
Dating back to the 1889 Civil code, this Law concedes citizenship after two years of legal 
residence to people from Latin America, the Philippines and Sephardic Jews, and ten years of 
legal residence for other foreigners. 
This differential treatment has been justified by an alleged need to cultivate relations 
with the former colonies (but not all of them, as in the case of Morocco, which was one of the 
last Spanish protectorates) and as answering for the historic debt that Spain had incurred with 
those countries that had been receiving Spanish immigrants for decades. It has also been 
explained by the objective of promoting immigration (or integration) of ‘people like us’ in 
linguistic or religious terms (López Sala, 2000: 375). 
The outcome of this policy was a process of Latin Americanisation of immigration 
during the 1990s and much of the 2000s, and the fact that a high proportion of foreigners who 
acquire Spanish nationality (81.52 per cent in 2006) come from the countries of Latin 
America (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2008). In terms of rights, this means inequality of 
access to the civil, political and labour rights associated with citizenship. In short, it is a 
selective, exclusive and discriminatory policy. 
One of the major conflicts regarding Latin American immigrants in Spain has involved 
the so-called street gangs or street organisations (see Feixa & Canelles 2006; Feixa et al. 
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2008). In 2002 a high school in Barcelona asked the municipal police to intervene after 
several violent events involving Latin American youth. The main street gangs in Spain are the 
Latin Kings, created in Chicago in the 1940s, and la Ñeta, created in Puerto Rico in the late 
1970s. As Feixa (2006) observed, these street organisations should not be understood as a 
mere continuation of the original groups but rather as resulting from the new context of 
immigration. Interestingly, the municipality of Barcelona has recently recognised them as 
cultural associations (the Organización cultural de Reyes y Reinas Latinos en Catalunya, and 
the Asociación sociocultural, deportiva y musical de Ñetas) with the aim of institutionalising 
their presence and, by so doing, preventing processes of social exclusion and violence.  
  
Chinese: The number of Chinese foreign residents in Spain grew from 28,692 in 2000 to 
85.745 in 2005 and 152,853 in 2010 (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2/2010). 
Chinese immigrants are concentrated in urban areas and along the Mediterranean coast. In 
terms of the labour market, most of them work in services (restaurants and retail trade) and in 
the garment industry and sweatshops. Though the Chinese are often seen as an 
‘unproblematic’ immigrant community, their presence in some particular economic sectors 
has sometimes aroused fear and distrust.  
 In September 2004, around 500 people demonstrated in Elche (near Valencia) to 
protest against the presence of Chinese businessmen in the area. In a context of a severe 
recession in the footwear sector, the demonstrators argued that Chinese were disloyal 
competitors as they operated beyond any governmental (tax) control. The demonstration 
concluded with the burning of two warehouses and a truck full of merchandise. In his 
thorough analysis of the event, Cachón explains it in terms of a result of pre-existing negative 
stereotypes and prejudices together with the unrest caused by a huge economic transformation 
and the consequent crisis in the sector. Quotinig Wieviorka (1998: 44), Cachón defines it as 
the ‘racism of the fall and social exclusion’ or the racism of the ‘poor white’ (Cachón, 2005: 
268).     
 
EU citizens: Europeans represent almost 40 per cent of all immigrants in Spain. The largest 
national groups are Romanian, British, Italians, Bulgarians, Portuguese, Germans and French 
(see Table 1 for absolute numbers and percentages). A significant proportion are pensioners 
migrating from North-Western Europe (mostly from the United Kingdom and Germany) and 
professionals. Moreover, there is a sizeable new immigration of economic migrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe, namely Romania and Bulgaria. Apart from the case mentioned 
above regarding Romanian gypsies, the presence of EU residents in Spain has not aroused 
particular distrust. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africans: Sub-Saharan Africans account for a small percentage of the total 
immigrant population in Spain. Most of them are from Senegal (38,716), Gambia (21,249), 
Mali (16,202), Nigeria (26,227) and Equatorial Guinea (9,985) (Spanish Ministry of Labour 
and Immigration, 2009). Although they are perceived as less problematic than Moroccans, 
their presence is commonly associated with illegality.  
First, they are associated with illegal border crossing. Images of fishing boats full of 
African migrants trying to reach the Spanish shores have been broadcast all over the world. 
Second, they have also been associated with informal work. Particularly in the summer, 
Spanish newspapers and televisions often report on their precarious status as illegal workers 
in the fields of Andalusia and Catalonia. Third, in recent years, they have also been associated 
with illegal street trading (the so-called top manta) in public spaces. Being mainly present in 
the tourist resorts on the Mediterranean coast, many municipalities are now trying to control 
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their presence either by exploring the possibility of legalising their trade (Calafell and El 
Vendrell) or in most cases, by increasing police control. The municipality of Barcelona – one 
of the cities with the largest presence of African street traders – is now trying to persuade 
them by making regularisation difficult for those who have been fined for selling illegally on 




Most diversity challenges in Spain have been related to religion, and more particularly to 
Islam. For instance, whenever the members of a Muslim community want to construct a 
mosque, an immediate reaction of neighbourhood protests begins, which is generally 
supported or at least not obstructed or contradicted by local authorities. It is a fact that in 
Spain, Muslim and Islamic issues have appeared in the public sphere with rather rigid images 
attached to them. Invariably, public opinion polls on these issues reveal that the majority of 
Spanish citizens link their opposition to immigrants in general to the Muslim community in 
particular (Pérez-Díaz, Álvarez-Miranda & Chuliá, 2004). 
 Conflicts around Islam should first be understood in the context of the Spanish identity 
construction, which as explained above is based on a traditional negative perception of 
Muslims and more specifically Moroccans, who are considered in pejorative terms as 'the 
Moor' (el moro) (Zapata-Barrero 2006: 143). Second, these conflicts should also be explained 
in terms of a dual and apparently contradictory process: the secularisation of the state but the 
ongoing predominant position of the Catholic church. While the shift to a secular state has 
tended to relegate religious practices to the private sphere, the asymmetrical relationship with 
the Catholic church has in practice led to the non-fulfilment of the agreements signed with 
minority religions (see Zapata-Barrero, 2011a). Third, and finally, as in many other European 
countries, some cultural practices of Muslim communities are increasingly perceived as 
opposed to liberal values such as human dignity, freedom and equality. 
 
Conflicts around mosques, oratories and cemeteries: Conflicts around mosques and oratories 
(Muslim places of workship) have various strands (see Zapata-Barrero & de Witte, 2010): 
 
 Opposition to the building of mosques and/or opening of religious centres or oratories 
by both citizens and government. This shows a lack of social recognition of Muslims 
in the public space. 
 Discussion on the access of women to mosques and oratories. A particular criticism is 
that women’s access to mosques is either prohibited, or they have to use separate 
rooms. It is often perceived as unacceptable from the perspective of the principle of 
gender equality, or the principle of religious freedom. 
 Opposition to foreign funding of mosques. The main concern is that poorly resourced 
mosques depend on funding from foreign sources, including extremist groups. 
 Criticisms of radical imams leading mosques. As these religious leaders are either 
educated abroad or completely uneducated at all, the fear is that they advocate 
interpretations of Islam that are in conflict with the legal and social norms in Spanish 
society. In an attempt to prevent imams from spreading hateful and violent ideas, the 
government proposed to monitor and censor mosque sermons in May 2004. Protests 
by Muslim and civil liberty groups led to the retraction of the proposal. As an 
alternative, the main Moroccan immigrant workers organisation (ATIME) proposed a 
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system of self-control of mosques (including supervision of mosques and appointment 
of imams) led by local and national Muslim councils. 
 
Conflicts around religious education: Conflicts around religious education have been based 
around three main topics (see Zapata-Barrero, 2011a):  
 
 Discussion on the predominance of Catholic education. Catholic education must be 
offered in public schools, although students are free to choose it or otherwise. While 
no alternative needs to be provided in primary schools, in secondary school an 
alternative course (history of religions) should be offered but students are also free to 
choose neither of these options (Rodríguez de Paz 2006; Morán 2006). There have 
also been debates on the presence of Catholic symbols in schools. Interestingly, when 
some parents criticised the presence of crucifixes in the classroom, the council of 
education of the Castilla y León Autonomous Community asked them to be 'tolerant,' 
arguing the need for toleration in a sphere of convivencia (peaceful coexistence). In 
2010 the draft of the new Organic Law for the Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
prohibited the presence of religious symbols in public schools. 
 Discussion on the right of religious education in both public and private schools. 
Although the agreements between the Spanish state and the Jewish, Evangelic and 
Muslim communities guarantee the right of religious education, in practice most 
schools do not provide this. 
 Discussion on the new compulsory course (final year in primary education and 
throughout secondary school), called ‘Education for Citizenship and Human Rights’ 
(Educación para la ciudadanía y derechos humanos). Following recommendations 
from both the Council of Europe and the European Union, this new course was 
introduced in 2006 in order to teach individual and social ethics and democratic 
values, including topics such as climate change, human rights, immigration, 
multiculturalism, etc. The arguments for were the need to create democratic citizens 
and prevent inequalities between sexes, minorities, etc. The arguments against come 
from the Catholic Church and related groups who argue that it might lead to value 
indoctrination by the state and is against the principle of freedom of ideology and 
religion. 
 
Conflicts based on dress code: Conflicts have arisen around headscarves in schools and 
burqas and niqabs in public spaces. The terms of the debates have been the following: 
 
 Headscarves in schools: the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in public schools has not 
been as controversial as in other European countries until very recently. However, 
opinion has been divided between those who defend religious symbols as part of 
religious freedom and those who would like to see the prohibition of religious signs in 
the public sphere in the name of liberal-republican values (Pérez-Barco & Bastante 
2006; Martí, 2007). When schools prohibited girls wearing from the Islamic veil 
(hijab) based on the internal rules of the centre that prohibits all elements of 
discrimination, the responses were also diverse. For instance, the Catalan government 
intervened in 2007 to reverse the school prohibition by arguing that the right to 
education had priority over the regulation of (religious) symbols (Escriche, 2007). In 
spring 2010, the right-wing regional government of Madrid supported a school 
prohibition, while the Socialist national government opposed it arguing that the right 
to education took priority. This latter case led to a major national debate that 
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continued with the discussions on the draft of the new Organic Law for the Freedom 
of Conscience and Religion. 
 Burqas and niqabs in public spaces: In 2010 some municipalities (first in Catalonia 
and then in Andalusia) began to prohibit the burqa and niqab in public buildings. In 
June the Senate also approved – albeit by a thin majority – a proposition made by the 
Partido Popular to ban the use of the burqa and niqab in all public spaces. Those who 
defend these measures argue that the burqa and niqab violate women’s dignity and the 
principle of equality, and pose a threat to public security. Those against the ban argue 
that these measures have the effect of shutting women in their houses and polarising 




Immigration is often seen as a challenge to Spain’s linguistic diversity. For instance, in the 
Spanish case, the presence of Latin American immigrants reinforces the weight of Castilian 
Spanish and is therefore often perceived as a threat to the situation of minority languages such 
as Catalan, Galician or Basque. In consequence, when traditional and new linguistic diversity 
come together, immigration policies tend to turn into linguistic policies.  
 
Conflicts around education: Conflicts around language education have mostly taken place in 
Catalonia and the Basque country. While both examples reveal the difficult balance between 
the promotion of native languages and the acceptance of immigrants’ languages in the public 
space, the institutional responses have been different in each case: 
 
 Catalan education: the Language and Social Cohesion Plan from the Catalan 
Education Department (2007) was aimed at consolidating social cohesion by 
simultaneously promoting intercultural education and the Catalan language. While its 
starting point is to guarantee equality for all and respect for diversity, social cohesion 
is understood as a precondition for the celebration of cultural diversity and Catalan 
language learning is deemed to be the main tool to create this. One of the aims of the 
Plan is therefore to consolidate Catalan as the vehicular language in schools. In 
practice, this tends to take the form of a rather assimilatory linguistic policy and 
creates an extra difficulty for newcomers that neither speak Catalan as a mother 
tongue nor have the opportunity to learn it in their immediate (Spanish speaking) 
social environments. 
 Basque education: parents in the Basque country are free to determine the linguistic 
model they want for their children. Model A is Spanish-language teaching with 
Basque as a compulsory subject. Model B combines Basque and Spanish as vehicular 
languages under comparable conditions. Finally, Model D involves Basque being the 
vehicular language of instruction for all subjects, with the exception of Spanish 
language and literature (Ruiz Vieytez 2007: 8). The coexistence of different linguistic 
models raises the question of whether this will lead to a retreat of the Basque language 
in schools or to a segmented educational system with immigrant students following 
Spanish speaking teaching, and autochthonous students using the educational models 
with a higher profile of Basque.  
 
Conflicts around Catalan as preferential language: The new Statute of Autonomy of 
Catalonia (2006) provides Catalonia’s basic institutional regulations. It defines the rights and 
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obligations of citizens in Catalonia, the main political institutions with their competences and 
relations with the rest of Spain, and the financing of the Government of Catalonia. Moreover, 
the Statute stipulates that Catalan is the preferential working language (lengua vehicular) in 
Catalonia. This has led to many discussions, particularly regarding the following aspects: 
 
 Catalan as the preferential working language in the government and media: while the 
Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia – approved by referendum in June 2006 – defined 
Catalan as the common and preferential language in the Catalan government 
administration and media, in June 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled that Catalan 
was indeed the common language but could not have a preferential position vis-à-vis 
Castilian Spanish. 
 Catalan as the basic public language for the reception of immigrants: according to the 
Catalan Citizenship and Immigration Plan (2005-2008) and the National Pact for 
Immigration (2008), one of the main challenges for the construction of a 'common 
public culture' is making Catalan the basic public language in Catalonia. Based on this 
claim, the Reception Bill (Llei d'acollida) establishes that Catalan will be the working 
language for the reception and integration of migrants, meaning that immigrants will 
be required to learn Catalan first. This led the Spanish Ombudsman to present an 
appeal to the Constitutional Court in August 2010 on the grounds that Catalan could 
not be the only language recommended in the Reception Bill, as this infringes the right 




4. Definitions of tolerance 
 
After having described the key features of Spanish national identity and integration 
philosophies and having mapped the main conflicts based around diversity in Spain, it 
remains to be seen under what terms these tensions have been perceived. With this in mind, in 
this chapter we analyse whether, in which context, regarding what issues and by whom is the 
term ‘tolerance’ used. This will allow us to understand which diversity-related conflicts have 
been understood in terms of ‘tolerance’ and which ones as issues of equality, respect, 
recognition or accommodation.  
 A review of parliamentary discussions and electoral programmes from the main 
political parties (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español and the Partido Popular) since the 
1980s shows that the term tolerance is seldom used by Spanish politicians and, when referred 
to, it is exclusively in terms of value, habit/attitude/disposition or virtue. For instance, 
Canovas Montalban – a member of parliament for the PSOE – stated in the Spanish 
parliament in 1997 that tolerance was an ‘essential value’ and that ‘education for cultural, 
ethnic and ideological diversity, and for respect for diversity and the rejection of violence is 
an unavoidable obligation at a time when xenophobia, intolerance and lack of solidarity are 
not past but present terms’1. In the electoral programmes of the right-wing party PP, the term 
tolerance always goes hand in hand with living together (convivencia) and with other terms 
such as respect, equality, freedom and solidarity.  
 A look at integration plans at both national and regional level leads to the same 
conclusion: the term tolerance is only used as a synonym of respect for difference. For 
instance, in the most recent Spanish integration plan (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e 
                                                     
1
  The quotations have been translated from Spanish to English by the authors. 
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Integración, 2007-2010), one of the ten general objectives is to ‘promote understanding from 
Spanish society for the phenomenon of immigration, to improve interculturality (convivencia 
intercultural) by valuing diversity and favouring values of tolerance, and to support the 
maintenance and knowledge of migrants’ cultures of origin’. Similarly, integration plans 
produced in Andalusia and Madrid refer to ‘tolerance’ as a basic democratic value and as a 
prerequisite for ‘living together’. The word tolerance is seldom used in the Catalan integration 
plans, while other concepts such as pluralism, equality, civic responsibility and convivencia 
are constantly referred to. 
 In general terms, we can therefore conclude that the term tolerance is rarely used and 
when it is, it refers to liberal respect, meaning the need for democratic citizens to respect each 
other as legal and political equals, according to a logic of emancipation rather than toleration 
(see Bader, 2010: 7). In fact, a more permissive conception of the term – accepting the power 
of interference or the power not to tolerate – would have been at odds with the common 
definition of integration as a bidirectional process based on the concept of convivencia 
intercultural, i.e. living together in solidarity, tolerance, respect and recognition for cultural, 
religious and ethnic differences.  
Despite this reluctance to use the word tolerance in other senses than that of respect 
and recognition, there seems to be a general consensus that basic values such as human 
dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and equality should be respected. In practice, 
even when not formulated in this way, these values define the limits of what can and cannot 
be tolerated. In this respect, it can be said that the notion of ‘tolerance’ does exist but that the 
concept does not. In other words, while the meanings and practices of tolerance are known 
and used, there is no term to cover them. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss in 
which context, regarding what and by whom the limits of what is tolerable and what is not 
have been imposed.  
Regarding the context, it is possible to say that the ‘tolerance’ boundary is commonly 
referred to when cultural diversity is perceived as being contradictory to human rights, 
freedom and individual autonomy/dignity. Media debates are very illustrative of these 
arguments and terminologies. A review of the national newspaper El País since 2000 suggest 
that this opposition is commonplace. For instance, Josep Ramoneda – a well-known Catalan 
intellectual – states that ‘tolerance starts by making clear the rules of the game of the open 
society that are in place here and by demanding their implementation’ (El País, 2nd February 
2010). In a similar vein, Marc Carrillo – professor of Constitutional Law at Pompeu Fabra 
University – argues the following: ‘[…] the democratic state is based on the tolerance towards 
cultural diversity that citizens express, as the holders of fundamental rights. But tolerance is 
not indifference. And respect towards traditions that become human behaviour in a 
multicultural society are not and cannot be unlimited. The guarantee of human rights is an 
impassable border, otherwise the democratic state would lose its identity’ (El País, 
29/04/2009). 
Regarding the what, we can conclude that the ‘tolerance’ boundary has mainly been 
drawn with regard to Islam. Once again on the basis of the articles published in El País, most 
debates on the opposition between cultural diversity on the one hand, and human rights and 
freedom on the other have been based around issues such as headscarves in schools, burqas in 
public spaces and, more generally, male/female relations. In these debates, there is a tendency 
to indule in generalisations, i.e. discussions do not only focus on particular practices by 
particular people but tend to attribute particular practices to the whole group (Muslims) and 
religion (Islam). In some cases, these practices are presented as an illustration of the 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy, freedom and equality and, in other cases, they 
are thought as examples of the backward nature of Islam vis-à-vis the modern West. This 
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leads us to conclude that when looking at media debates, there is a common (and dangerous) 
shift from targeting particular practices to targeting groups and ‘cultures’ as a whole. 
Regarding the who, i.e. who has the power to tolerate or otherwise, most cases involve 
either local administrations (for instance, concerning the use of the burqa in public spaces) or 
practitioners, including social workers (with regard to male/female relations) and educators 
(with regard to the use of the headscarf in schools). This leads us to two main conclusions. 
First, local authorities and practitioners (within the state apparatus or otherwise) seem to be 
the main actors playing the role of ‘tolerators’. In this regard, although further research is 
needed, our hypothesis is that toleration is particularly exercised among the actors most 
deeply involved in the formulation and implementation of integration policies. Second, we 
can also conclude that, when looking at conflicts based around diversity and analysing the 
limits of what is considered as tolerable or not, we should take into account not only the 
central government but also a wider range of actors, including other administrative levels such 
as regional and local governments; other institutions, agencies and practitioners within the 
state apparatus; and other relevant actors, such as politicians, NGOs and private institutions. 
We suggest therefore – following Maussen’s (2007: 5) definition – to shift the focus from 
government to governance in order to widen the analysis beyond the state as an actor, and 




5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this last chapter, we highlight the main features that characterise the Spanish case from a 
comparative European perspective. In short, the question that underlines these final 
paragraphs is what the distinctive features of Spain are when we consider issues such as 
immigration, identity, diversity and tolerance. 
 
1. In comparison with other European countries, immigration in Spain is a recent 
phenomenon that has developed very intensively in a very short period of time. Indeed, the 
number of foreign residents in Spain increased from 250,000 in 1985 to almost 1 million in 
2000, and more than 4 million in 2010. This means, on the one hand, that most immigrants 
have arrived in the last ten years and still have a temporary status and, on the other, that the 
debates on immigration and policies regarding immigration and diversity are still rather new. 
 
2. Spanish identity, or what we called Spanishness, has been built upon two main pillars: 
language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism). The Francoist political argument ‘habla 
cristiano’ (speak Christian) illustrates how these two markers were even merged in the 
attempt to build a culturally homogeneous society. At the same time, Spain has to a great 
extent remained a multinational country with three main historical minority nations with their 
own languages: Galician, Basque and Catalan. This explains why immigration has often been 
perceived as a challenge to national linguistic and cultural diversity in Spain. 
 
3. The main conflicts around migrant minorities are socio-economic in nature. If we consider 
conflicts around diversity, a distinct feature of the Spanish case is that they have been 
articulated around the two main markers of Spanish identity. While conflicts around language 
have been of a political nature and have mostly referred to the status of the languages of 
minority nations, conflicts around religion have been of a more social nature and have 
focused on two main themes: the predominance of the Catholic church in the new context of 
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secularisation and immigration, and the institutionalisation of Islam and the prohibition of 
particular (Muslim) practices. 
 
4. Policy discourses emphasise interculturality, respect and recognition for cultural, religious 
and ethnic differences over concepts such as integration or assimilation. This discourse of 
interculturality may explain why the term tolerance is seldom used in Spain and, when it is, it 
refers to liberal respect, thus denoting emancipation rather than toleration. At the same time, 
there is a broad consensus that values such as human dignity and human rights, freedom, 
democracy and equality draw the line between what can and cannot be tolerated. This is 
where respect-based approaches turn into permission-based approaches, thereby accepting the 
power of interference or the power not to tolerate. While this power is mainly exercised vis-à-
vis particular practices, there has been a shift in public debate from not tolerating particular 
practices to not tolerating particular groups and ‘cultures’.  
 
5. Despite the general reluctance to use ‘tolerance’ in terms of permission, liberal values in 
practice establish the limits of what is tolerable. Here we find a clear convergence with other 
European countries. Examples include the French anti-headscarf law of 2004, and the 
invocation of ‘Dutch norms and values’ in Dutch civic integration courses. The relevant 
question here is which practices really do challenge liberal values. It is also essential to 
consider when or under which circumstances these prohibitions run contrary to the very 
liberal values upon which they are based. In more specific terms, by excluding those 
perceived as ‘not liberal enough’, when or under what circumstances do we run the risk of 
falling into the paradox of claiming liberal values for illiberal purposes? 
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